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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

STEPHEN C. HENLINE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020056-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (Supp. 2002), in the
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Utah, the Honorable David S. Young
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Where defense counsel stipulated to the admission of defendant's
Breathalyzer test results, (A) did the trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte
excluding the stipulation, and (B) was defense counsel ineffective for not objecting to the
admission of the test results?

1

Standards of Review: (A) To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate
that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
(B) Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal are reviewed as a
matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are included at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002);
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol,
a third degree felony, and improper lane travel, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-2. The case
was tried before a jury. R. 22-23,68. The jury convicted defendant on Count I. R. 53.
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory indeterminate prison term of zero to five years.
R. 55-56. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 57.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on June 21,2001, Officer Elwyn Slagowski received a
callfromdispatch informing him that a car had slid off Interstate 80 outside Wendover.
R. 68:9-10. Twenty minutes later, at about eighteen milesfromthe Nevada-Utah state

'The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2

line, Officer Slagowski saw a car stuck in the mud, three-fourths of the way across the
median. R. 68:11,26,28. Officer Slagowski discerned that the car was heading
eastbound because there were continuous skid marks where the car had slid off the road.
R. 68:12. As he approached the car, the officer could tellfromthe footprints in the soft
mud that the driver had exited the car, walked to the back of the car and then around to
the passenger side, and re-entered the car on the passenger side. R. 68:13, 30.
The officer also observed that defendant was reclined and asleep in the passenger
seat R. 68:14, 30. As Officer Slagowski awakened defendant, he smelled alcohol and
noticed that defendant had red, watery eyes. R. 68:15. When asked if he had been
drinking, defendant admitted that he was drinking Southern Comfort, but quickly
qualified his statement by saying, "my sister was driving, I wasn't." R. 68:17. Officer
Slagowski then administered a field sobriety test, which defendant failed. R. 68:17-20.
The fact that defendant failed his field sobriety test was stipulated to at trial. R. 68:20.
Officer Slagowski then placed defendant under arrest, read him his Miranda
warnings, and questioned him. R. 68:21. Defendant told the officer that he drank beer
and three to four shots of Southern Comfort at the casino and had his last drink at about
4:30 in the morning. R. 68:22,30. Defendant also said he had not had any alcohol since
"the crash." R. 68:29. Officer Slagowski searched defendant's car, including the trunk,
underneath the seats, and the surrounding highway, but found no alcoholic beverage
containers. R. 68:16, 26-28.

\

3

At 8:43 a.m., approximately two hours and twenty minutes after Officer Slagowksi
first arrived at the accident scene, the officer took defendant to the police station and
administered a blood-alcohol test. R. 68:23. Defendant's blood-alcohol level was .173
percent, more than double Utah's legal limit. Id. The results of defendant's Breathalyzer
test were stipulated to at trial. Id.
At trial, defendant claimed that he drove to WendoverfromSalt Lake City at about
9:30 p.m. to test drive the new car he had recently repaired. R. 68:33,42. When he
arrived in Wendover, he gambled at several casinos and decided to drive back to Salt
Lake City at approximately 2:30 in the morning. R. 68:33. While on his way home,
defendant said he became sleepy and decided to make a U-turn and head back to
Wendover to get a hotel room for the night. R. 68:34. Unfortunately, his car got stuck in
the mud on the median. R. 68:35.
Upset because he had recently purchased the car, defendant said he walked around
the car to the trunk, removed half a bottle full of vodkafromthe trunk, walked over to the
passenger side, and drank the bottle. R. 68:35-36,46. When hefinishedthe bottle of
vodka, he "opened the door, stepped out and gave it a good chuck across the highway."
R. 68:37,48. Although unsure, defendant said he probably heard the bottle "clink" as it
landed, but that he was "pretty drunk at that time" and "wasn't really worried about what
was going on around [him.]" R. 68:37. He then tilted the seat back and went to sleep,
only to be awaken by Officer Slagowski at about 6:30 a.m. R. 68:38,40.
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Defendant testified that he told Officer Slagowski that he had consumed two beers
and several shots of Southern Comfort at the casinos, but that he did not mention the
bottle of vodka. R. 68:40-42,44-45. He also told the officer that his sister was driving
the car and that she got mad when the car became stuck and found arideback to
Wendover. R. 68:38. However, defendant admitted at trial that this story was a lie. R.
68:38-39. Defendant only mentioned his sister because he was afraid that if he admitted
to drinking in his car, his commercial driver's license would be revoked. R. 68:39,43,
48. He also confessed that he did not mention the bottle of vodka because he knew "[i]t's
illegal to have alcohol in your car." R. 68:44-45.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte excluding
evidence of defendant's Breathalyzer test results for lack of foundation. Alternatively,
defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission
of the test results. However, defendant's claims ignore the fact that defense counsel
stipulated to the admission of the test results.
Where defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the test results for strategic
reasons, defendant cannot show that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte
interceding. Any interference by the trial court in defense counsel's strategy could have
been harmful to defendant's case. Thus, the trial court appropriately honored the defense
counsel's stipulation. Moreover, the invited error doctrine precludes defendant's plain
error claim. Given the fact that defendant stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer
5

test results, he cannot now claim that the trial court plainly erred in receiving his
stipulation.
In light of defense counsel's stipulation to the admission of the Breathalyzer test
results, defendant must prove that the stipulation was unreasonable to show that his
counsel was ineffective. Defendant fails to make such a showing. The record indicates
that defense counsel's decision to stipulate to the admission of the Breathalyzer test
results was reasonable. Thus, because defendant cannot show that his counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, his
claim fails.
ARGUMENT
POBVTI
WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL STIPULATED TO THE
ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S BREATHALYZER
TEST RESULTS, DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY
NOT SUA SPONTE EXCLUDING THE TEST
RESULTS, AND THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR
ADMISSION
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it allowed defendant's
Breathalyzer test results into evidence at trial without sua sponte requiring the State to
establish thereliabilityof those tests. Br. of Aplt. at 6-7, 9-10. Alternatively, he claims
that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of test results at trial.
Id. at 7-9. Defendant's claims lack merit.

6

A.

Where defendant stipulated to the admission of his Breathalyzer test
results, his claim that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte
excluding the test results fails.

To establish that the trial court plainly erred in accepting the Breathalyzer test
results into evidence, defendant must demonstrate that "(0 t a l n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). Defendant's plain error claim fails because his counsel
reasonably stipulated to the admission of the test results.
Defendant asserts that there was no stipulation to the Breathalyzer test results. See
Br. of Apit. at 6-9. However, the record refutes that assertion. Although a written
stipulation is not in the record, the trial transcript establishes that defense counsel did
stipulate to admission of the Breathalyzer test results. During opening statements the
prosecutor explained to the jury that the parties had stipulated to the test results.
There's no issue that [defendant] was drinking. We'll stipulate that and
counsel will stipulate that [defendant] blew in the [Breathalyzer] which is
what measures your breath alcohol or your blood alcohol, he blew over .17
which is twice the legal limit. We'll have to stipulate and we will stipulate
that this took place, the [Breathalyzer] took place almost three hours, in
fact, two and a half hours after the [S]argent first makes contact with
[defendant].
R. 68:3. Accordingly, at some point before trial the prosecutor agreed to stipulate that
the test took place two-and-a-half hours after the officer first encountered defendant
asleep in his car, and defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the admission of the
Breathalyzer test results. See id.

7

The reason for this stipulation becomes clearer during defense counsel's opening
remarks. Addressing whether defendant had control of the vehicle, defense counsel
argued:
Our point on that is, just so you know upfront,at 6:30 in the morning or
whenever it was that Officer Slagowski stopped [defendant], we'll tell you
and admitrightupfront,[defendant]was too drunk to drive at 6:30 in the
morning, okay? But the point is so you understand what we're arguing
about, is at 6:30 in the morning [defendant] was not in actual physical
control of the motor vehicle, okay?

[W]hen the car was driven into the mud, okay, was the defendant in actual
physical control of the vehicle? Yes. And at the time he drove the car into
the mud was he drunk? Had he consumed so much alcohol he was unable
to safely operate the vehicle? The point is, at that time, no, okay? Does
that make sense. Time wise we're talking about two different time periods.
[Defendant] is saying he's basically sitting out in that mud and he'll testify
today, approximately four hours, okay. He did not consume the alcohol
basically until after he was stuck in the mud trying to turn his vehicle
around and go back to Wendover, okay? So you need to keep the time
periods separate. That's an important thing to keep in mind about what
time periods we're talking about, okay? And I think that's important for
you to talk about today and to pay attention to.
Also, I think [the prosecutor] hit this point as well, but just to make sure
you understand, [the prosecutor] talked about the blood alcohol test,
okay—and you'll get into a jury instruction on this but basically it says if
you're over .08, you're deemed basically unable to drive a vehicle. It's
illegal to drive a vehicle when your blood alcohol is at .08. However, that
test is only admissible when it's taken within two hours of the actual
driving, okay? Anytime after that, it's up to you to decide what to do with
it.
R. 68:6-7. Defense counsel's remarks clearly indicate that the Breathalyzer test results
were undisputed. See id. Instead, defense counsel was disputing the overall weight of a

8

Breathalyzer test taken over two hours after the officer first encountered defendant who
had allegedly already yielded control of the vehicle. See id.
Further evidence of the stipulation surfaced as the prosecutor questioned Officer
Slagowski. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the officer a series of
questions regarding the nature offieldsobriety tests. See R. 68:17-20. At that point,
defense counsel interrupted the questioning and the following colloquy occurred.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I guess I'm questioning how relevant this is.
We've already pretty much stipulated the fact
that my client failed thefieldsobriety test. For
the sake of time, do we need to keep going over
them all?
[PROSECUTOR]:

If we stipulate up to the (inaudible) of it then the
only issue whey we were bringing it up, Your
Honor, is that this came approximately 6:30 in
the morning where the breath alcohol wasn't
take [sic] until some time later. That's the only
reason. If [defense counsel] stipulates to it—

THE COURT:

All right. [Defense counsel] stipulates. You've
had a stipulation and you may consider it as
established so the State has established by the
agreement of the parties that [defendant] failed
thefieldsobriety tests.

R. 68:20. Then, the prosecutor conducted the following inquiry without objection from
defense counsel.
[PROSECUTOR]

Trooper, did you subsequently then have
[defendant] perform a test, a breath alcohol test?

[OFFICER]

Yes.

9

[PROSECUTOR]

And I believe it was stipulated too. What
results did you receive off of that?

[OFFICER]

The results from his breath test was a .173
percent at 8:43 in the morning.

[PROSECUTOR]

So .173. What is the legal limit in the State of
Utah?

[OFFICER]

.08.

[PROSECUTOR]

.08. So this is double. However, this
comes—you get to the scene between 6:10 and
6:20. This comes at 8:43?

[OFFICER]

Correct.

[PROSECUTOR]

So it's about two hours and 20 minutes
approximately after you first arrived at the
scene?

[OFFICER]

From when Ifirstarrived at the scene.

R. 68:23.
The parties' stipulation was also memorialized in Instruction No. 7, which was
read to the jury following the presentation of evidence.
The results of the chemical test would be admissible as evidence of a
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating or
actual physical control. But you as the trier of fact, shall determine what
weight is to be given to the result: of the test.
R. 68:53.
As indicated by defense counsel's remarks, defense counsel stipulated to the
Breathalyzer test results for strategic reasons. Counsel argued that defendant only began
drinking after his vehicle got stuck in the mud and he no longer was in control of the
10

vehicle. See R. 68:6-7. Thus, defense counsel sought to downplay the Breathalyzer test
results which were taken hours after defendant began drinking. See id.
Given that strategy, it necessarily follows that a trial court's sua sponte
intercession requiring that the State establish the foundation for the Breathalyzer test
results could have adversely interfered with trial counsel's legitimate strategy. For that
reason, a trial court is "'not required to constantly survey or second-guess the
nonobjecting party's best interests or trial strategy.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343
(Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937,939 (Utah 1996). Therefore,
because defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer test results,
defendant cannot show that there was an obvious error that the trial court should have sua
sponte rectified. See Dunn, 850P.2dat 1208.2
Invited error. In any event, the invited error doctrine deprives defendant of his
plain error claim. "The 'invited error' doctrine 'prohibits a partyfromsetting up an error
at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah
App. 1998) ajfd, 1999 UT 79,985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205
(Utah App. 1991) (additional quotations omitted)). "[Appellate courts] have refused to
give defendants the benefit of traditional plain error analysis where doing so would create
2

Additionally, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the admission of
the Breathalyzer test results. Even without the test results, defendant's admission that he
had several drinks before leaving the casinos, the skids marks of his tires indicating that
he lost control of his vehicle before getting stuck in the mud, and the fact that he failed
the field sobriety tests were enough to convict defendant of driving under the influence of
alcohol. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002).
11

an incentive for invited error." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (citing
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)). Accordingly, where a stipulation is
offered, "[a defendant is precluded from arguing on appeal that it was plain error for the
trial court to [receive] it." State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, f 21, 37 P.3d 1180 (citing
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31); Layman, 953 P.2d at 785.
Given defense counsel's stipulation to the admission of the Breathalyzer test
results, defendant is precluded from arguing on appeal that it was plain error for the trial
court to accept the test results into evidence. See id at 785-86. Therefore, because
defendant attempted to '"set[] up an error at trialf,] and [is now] complaining of it on
appealf,]'" his claim fails. Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 (citation omitted).
B.

Defense counsel decision not to object to the admission of the
Breathalyzer test results did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Alternatively, defendant argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance for not objecting to the admission of the Breathalyzer test results. Br. of Aplt.
at 7-9. Specifically, defendant argues (1) that trial counsel rendered deficient
performance by "allowing] the [S]tate to put on a more credible case than it otherwise
would have been able to do(,]" and (2) that defendant was prejudiced because without
foundational evidence to support the Breathalyzer test results, the test results would have
been inadmissible, and therefore "the jury would have never known [sic] how drunk
[defendant] really was." Id. at 8-9. However, defendant's claims ignore the fact that
counsel stipulated to the admission of the test results.
12

"With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment[,]" and "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."" State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 19,12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-89 (1984) and Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101 (1955)). "Second, the
defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it
affected the outcome of the case." Id.
Given the fact that defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer
test results, defendant must demonstrate that the stipulation was unreasonable to show
that counsel's performance was deficient. See Tueller, 2001 UT App 317,121.
Defendant has not alleged, much less shown that the stipulation was unreasonable. In
fact, the record indicates that trial counsel had several legitimate reasons for stipulating to
the admission of the test results. First, nothing in the record indicates that the
Breathalyzer test results were inadmissible. See record generally. Certainly, the State
could have subpoenaed the records custodian to testify as to the test's reliability. Rather
than waste time and resources by forcing the State to lay the proper foundation for
admission of the test results, defense counsel chose to stipulate to their admissibility.
This decision was reasonable. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^ 34,989 P.2d 52 ('"the
failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not
constitute ineffective assistance."') (Citations omitted).
13

Second, the record indicates that defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the
admission of the Breathalyzer test results in exchange for the prosecutor's stipulation to
the hour when the test was taken. See R. 68:3. To put forth his theory of the case,
counsel needed to show that the test results had no bearing on whether defendant was
inebriated at the time his vehicle left the road. SeeR. 68:6-7. Therefore, it was
reasonable for defense counsel to offer his stipulation in exchange for needed evidence.
Third, as shown above, defense counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for not
requiring the State to establish the reliability of the Breathalyzer test results. Defense
counsel argued that defendant was sober when his vehicle got stuck in the mud and that
defendant only began drinking after he was no longer in control of his vehicle. See R.
68:6-7. The fact that defendant's blood alcohol level was show to be. 173 several hours
later only supported his story. Accordingly, counsel's decision to stipulate to the test
results was a strategic move to minimize weight of that evidence. See State v. Bullock,
791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990) ("Whenever there is a
legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it
did not produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel.").
Given the reasonableness of defense counsel's decision to stipulate to the
admission of the Breathalyzer test results, defense counsel's actions did not fall below an
"objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/5 See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f
19. Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See State v. MedinaJuarez, 2001 UT 79,1f 14, 34 P.3d 187 (where a defendant fails to establish either prong
14

of the Strickland test, counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and the other
prong of the test need not be addressed).3
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to affirm
defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Dated this / % -^day of October, 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

JPFREY Ti^COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee

3

In the Argument Summary section of his brief, defendant claims that "as the
motor vehicle was clearly not operable as testified to by the police officer, he could not be
found guilty of being in actual physical control of an operable motor vehicle while
intoxicated." Br. of Aplt at 6. That sentence is the singular place this claim appears in
defendant's brief. See generally Br. of Aplt. No citation or analysis is offered in its
support. See id. Accordingly, where defendant's claim is inadequately briefed it need not
be considered by this court. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("[t]he argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, f | 5-6,1 P.3d 1108 ("[an appellate court] is not a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research") (citation omitted); State
v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ^11,974 P.2d 269 ("an appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief) (Citation omitted).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / f f ^ a y of October, 2002,1 served two copies of the
attached Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, STEPHEN C. HENLINE, by
causing the same to be mailed, viafirstclass mail, postage prepaid, to his counsel of
record, as follows:
JULIEGEORGE
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

mmmmm.

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration —Measurement of
blood or breath alcohol — C r i m i n a l punishment — A r r e s t without warrant —
Penalties — S u s p e n s i o n or revocation of license.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving
under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance
that is taken illegally in the body;
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43;
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (1)(a)(i) through (v), which
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 7 6-3-402; or
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug,
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and

dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in
accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance
abuse program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local
ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-64 3; and
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater
at the time of operation or actual physical control.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of
Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:

(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a
third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (4)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol
level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in
accordance with Subsection (14).
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.

(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (5)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is ar:ropriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years
of two or more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after
July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July
1, 2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of
this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.

(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after
treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not
be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation or
parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this section may not
be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5)', and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person, to: participate in a
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily,
substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under
Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails
to:
(i) complete all court ordered:
(A) screening and assessment;
(B) educational series;
(C) substance abuse treatment; and
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment
costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the
person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and
(3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a

substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45,
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for
the first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or
conviction as defined under Subsection (1)
within a period of ten years from the date

person
if the
if the
of the

convicted of any
person has a prior
violation is committed
prior violation; and

(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court
under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was
based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those
persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for
a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use'of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law

enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be
monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a
substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the
time the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly
between those activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if
the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by
the court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor
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the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence,
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that
sentence or those conditions or orders.
(d) (i) The court may waive ail or part of the costs associated with
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover
the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher,
then if the court does not order:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then
the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the
record:
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
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41-6-44.3

Standards for chemical breath analysis —Evidence.

(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a
person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection
(1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1)
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary.

ADDENDUM B
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TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 2, 2001

2 :

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING

3 • *PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - OPENING STATEMENTS TO CLOSING STATEMENTS'
4

P R O C E E D I N G S

5

THE COURT:

Good morning. First of all welcome to the

6 I jurors. This is the time set for trial in the matter of State
i
7 | of Utah versus Stephen Kory Henline. The case is 011300264.
8 i
Are the parties present and prepared to proceed?
i

9 i

MR. BROADHEAD:

Yes, Your Honor. Scott Broadhead for

10 * the defendant.
11 ,

MR. SEARLE:

Yes, Your Honor. Gary Searle for the

.1

12 | State.
13 :

(Jury selection and voir dire not transcribed)

14

THE COURT:

The record will show we're reconvened in

15 ; the presence of the jury and we'll do opening statements. An
16 | opening statement is just simply an overview.

Evidence comes

17 ; from that to which both sides agree or may be called a
18 ;• stipulation for from witnesses.

Questions of attorneys and

19 : arguments of attorneys would not be evidence.
20

direction.

21
22

So your.opening statement please, if you would, Mr.
Searle.

23
24

It gives you

MR. SEARLE:
and gentlemen.

25 . today.

Thank you.

Your Honor, counsel, ladies

I'll make this brief.

Thank you for your time

We're going to try, Mr. Broadhead and I have been able

mmmmm^mm

to agree on most issues in this trial and we'll present
obviously the ones that are at issue to you today.

It's a case

involving a DUI, driving under the influence, and it's our
responsibility today to prove that on June 21st of this year,
the defendant, Mr. Henline, was driving while under the
influence of alcohol which rendered him incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
What happened in this matter is there was a call that
came in to Sargent Slagowski with the Highway Patrol that he
needed to respond to a car that had gone off the road on 1-80.
He got in his vehicle.

He got out there and it was just jafter*

six o'clock when he arrived at the scene and noticed the car
had - there were skid marks on the road.

A car had gone off

the road and after it had gone off the road, then they'd
attempted to drive through.
If you go out to Wendover, as the trip will tell you,
when you're out that far it's pretty much just salt and mud and
so the car slid off and then it attempted to drive through and
gotten stuck.

Trooper arrives, he looks, there's the car stuck

down there and one of the first thing he notices is is there
are footprints around the vehicle.

The footprints around the

vehicle extend only around the vehicle.

There are no

footprints, this is soft mud, there are no footprints that head
out away from the vehicle in any direction so you'll see that
we have a videotape and we'll just show the first portion of

1

that, just the first couple of minutes, showing you where it

2

is.

3

the car is stuck and the prints are around the car.

4

trooper then makes contact with the sole occupant of the car

There's no bushes out there.

There's nothing there and
So the

5 " and this is important because no one has left the vehicle and
6 ; there's only one person in the vehicle and the trooper sees
7
8

that there are prints that come from the driver's door around
!

9

and then in the passenger door.

Well, he makes contact with

the occupant of the vehicle and he will be identified as Mr.

10 ! Henline and Mr. Henline is asleep in the back seat of the car.
11

The keys to the car are on the passenger's rear with him.-

12 ,

When the trooper makes contact, he smells alcohol.

13 ! Mr. Henline is unsteady.
14

:

.;• -

been drinking.

There are some indications that he'd

He has him come up, takes some field sobriety

15 j tests which determines that he's under the influence of
16

alcohol.

17

He then begins to question him on that.
So. where really the issue that we're going to present

18

to you today comes forth.

19

drinking.

20

he blew in the intoxilizer which is what measures your breath

21

;

There's no issue that he was

We/11 stipulate that and counsel will stipulate that

alcohol or your blood alcohol, he blew over .17 which is twice

22

the legal limit.

We'll have to stipulate and we will stipulate

23

that this took place, the breathalyser took place almost three

24

hours, in fact, two and a half hours after the sargent first

25

makes contact with Mr. Henline.

So it's down the road but

- 3

1

they're waiting for a wrecker and he's doing the interview.

2

can't leave the car there until the wrecker comes so he's at

3

the mercy of some forces that he doesn't have any control over.

4

The issue here -is, was he intoxicated while driving?

5

He

Well,

there's some indications that we will present to you that
i

6 • showed, we feel shows, that he was intoxicated while driving.
7 | One, there's nobody else in the car so he was the driver of the
8 • car and there's nobody who has left the car.

Two, we'll show

9 ; that there were no alcoholic beverages, cans, bottles in the
i

10 | car, nor were there any in the immediate vicinity.

The trooper

11 ! takes his video camera and moves it so that you can see tjhis-: is
12 ! flat salt and there's no bottles or cans out there-

The reason

13 ; for this is the trooper will tell you, that he has people who
14 I will say, I'm here and I'm drinking while I'm waiting.
15 '
16

He then begins to interview Mr. Henline and Mr.
Henline in the interview says that he was at the State Line and

17 , he was at the casinos in Wendover, he'd been drinking beer and
18-; Southern Comfort.
19

He had his last drink at approximately 4:30

there, left the casinos, that's when the trooper then found him

20 i or was called out at six o'clock.

The trooper specifically

21 i asks him, there is a question that the trooper follows, the
22 ; State puts out a form of questions that then they follow
23

question for question as they go down it. One of those

24

questions is, have you drank since the crash?

25

trooper is asking the questions, he's reading it from the form

Now as the

1
2

and then there is a line and he indicates there on chat form
:

what the response is, if any. And the response is, uNo, I have

3

not had any - no, there was nothing to drink since the crash."

4

And the trooper will tell you that.

5

that he tells the trooper my sister was driving.

6 ! she left.

There's also indications
She got mad,

Once again I wasn't driving and there's some

7 > indications, the evidence will show that Mr. Henline wanted to
8

pass off on different people.

9 ;
10

That's really the facts here, to cut it to a chase.
We'll present evidence that shows, or we believe shows that he

11 ; was drinking before he wrecked the car while driving.
12

The

defense will put at issue that he drank after he was driving.

13 ' That's the only issue here, was he drinking before or after th
14

crash and we'11 provide evidence which we believe shows that h

15

was drinking before he crashed his car and therefore, he^was

16

under the influence.

Thank you.

17

THE COURT: All right.

18 1

Mr. Broadhead, you may make your opening statement

19

Thank you Mr. Searle.

now or reserve it.

20

MR. BROADHEAD:

I'll do it now Your Honor real

21

briefly.

Mr. Searle hit on a few points and I just want to

22

kind of narrow down what we're talking about here, okay?

23

think there are kind of two, pretty much two basic issues to

24

deal with, okay?

25

influence so we have the first issue is is at the time that th

I

Mr. Searle talked about driving under the

1

Officer approached Mr. Henline, so possibly 6:30 in the

2

morning, okay?

3

influence of alcohol, okay?

4

without getting too much into the law.

5

:

Was Mr. Henline driving a vehicle under the
That kind of takes two things
Number one, you have to

be in actual physical control of the vehicle, okay?

And you

i

6 ; have to be in such a condition that it makes you unsafe to
7

:

operate the vehicle based upon alcohol being in your system,

8 | Our point on that is, just so you know up front, at 6:30 in the
morning or whenever it was that Officer Slagowski stopped him,
10 | we'll tell you and admit right up front, Mr. Henline was too
i

11 I drunk to drive at 6:30 in the morning, okay?

But the point is

:

12 | so you understand what we're arguing about, is at 6:30 in the
j
13 I morning he was not in actual physical control of the motor
i

14 ! vehicle, okay? And there will be case law and the jury
15 i instructions the Judge will present that talks about what the
16

requirements are to be in actual physical control of the motor

17 j vehicle.

One of those is which the ability to move the vehicle

|

18 I and the evidence you'll hear, Officer Slagowski's, I'm sure
i

19

he'll admit it, 6:30 in the morning, that car couldn't move.

20 ! It was stuck in the mud, had to be towed out, it's not going
21 • anywhere, okay?

So at 6:30 in the morning, okay?

That's that

22 I issue.
23 '

Second issue is then you have to get to well, when

24

the car was driven into the mud, okay, was the defendant in

25

actual physical control of the vehicle?

Yes. And at the time

he drove the car into the mud was he drunk? Had he consumed so
much alcohol he was unable to safely operate the vehicle?
point is, at that time, no, okay?

Does that make sense.

wise we're talking about two different time periods.

The
Time

Mr.

Henline is saying he's basically sitting out in that mud and
he'll testify today, approximately four hours, okay.

He did

not consume the alcohol basically until after he was stuck in
the mud trying to turn his vehicle around and go back to
Wendover, okay?

So you need to keep the time periods separate.

That's an important thing to keep in mind about what time
periods we're talking about, okay?

And I think that's

Z

'-':

important for you to talk about today and to pay attention to.
Also, I think Mr. Searle hit this point as well, but
just to make sure you understand, Mr. Searle talked about the
blood alcohol test, okay - and you'll get into jury instruction
on this but basically it says if you're over .08, you're deemed
basically unable to drive a vehicle.

It's illegal to drive a

vehicle when your blood alcohol is at .08.

However, that test

is only admissible when it's taken within two hours of the
actual driving, okay?

Anytime after that, it's up to you to

decide what to do with it. Whether you think it's important
evidence, unimportant evidence and Mr. Searle, I think, missed
that last point that it's up to you to decide how much weight
to give that, okay, because it was taken two, three maybe for
all we know, five to seven hours after the last time any

alcohol was consumed.

We don't know exactly when, okay?

So

those are two key points.
Mr. Henline basically will also I'm sure tell you up
front that at the time he was stopped by Officer Slagowski or
approached, stop is kind of a legal term.

I should say

approached by Officer Slagowski since his vehicle was already
stopped, he'll readily admit he said some things to Officer
Slagowski that were not true.
officer there.

He was scared.

He's got an

He's trying to think of whatever he can think

of 'cause he knows he's in trouble, okay?

And he'll admit it.

"I said some things that weren't true" and he'll get up tq; the stand today and tell you what they were, okay?

And so, r'm

sure they're going to try to use that against him but you just
need to understand he's told me already that I said that to the
officer and it's not true, okay?

So you just be aware of that

because that's going to come out.

With that said, we'll close.

Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Your witness Mr. Searle.
MR. SEARLE:: Thank you Your Honor.
Sargent Slagowski.
THE COURT:

Step forward and be sworn please.
ELWYN SLAGOWSKI

having been duly sworn testified upon
his oath as follows:

1

DIRECT EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. SEARLE:

3

Q

Name and occupation.

4

THE COURT:

State your name and spell it.

5

THE WITNESS:

Sargent Elwyn L. Slagowski.

First name

6 i is spelled E-L-W-Y-N, last name S-L-A-G-O-W-S-K-I and I'm a
7

Sargent, District Commander for the Utah Highway Patrol, Tooele

8 | County, Wendover.
9 •

Q

(BY MR. SEARLE)

Thank you, Sargent.

How long have

10.i you been a trooper with the Highway Patrol?
11

A

12

12 years,

13

Q

14
15

I've been with the Highway Patrol for approximately :

Twelve years?

Here in Utah?

Have you had prior law

enforcement experience?
A

Yeah.

16

Q

And what were you in Wyoming?

17 • •

A

I was a police officer, city officer.

18 <

Q

Where did you receive your training to be a peace

19
20
21

;

I had approximately 12 years in Wyoming also.

officer?
A

I received training both in Wyoming Police Academy

and Utah Police Academy.

22

Q

Did you successfully complete those academies?

23

A

I did.

24
25

MR. BROADHEAD:
qualifications.

Your Honor, I'll stipulate to his

1

THE COURT:

2 '

MR. BROADHEAD:

3

Q

All right.

Thank you.

Let's get through all of this.

(BY MR. SEARLE)

One thing that I just want to talk

4 ; briefly about is your qualifications as far as alcohol or
5 | observance of alcohol.

Do you have some unique qualifications

6 i in observing alcohol or individuals who under the influence of
7 i alcohol?
8 |
9

A

Yes,

I've been trained in the DUI detection at the

(inaudible) and I'm instructor for field sobriety testing

10 ! techniques for the State of Utah, in fact I'm certified
i

11 j throughout the nation and I'm also a drug recognition expert
12 I instructor and alcohol is, in fact, one of the seven drucr
I
13 : categories.
14 i

Q

And do you teach at POST?

15 I

A

I teach all three POSTs through the State.

16 I

Q

All throughout the State.

17 ;

A

It's all POST (inaudible).

Q

Okay.

1

18

Thank you, Trooper.

Sargent, were you on call

19 ' or on duty on June 21 of this year?
i

20

A

I was on call, yes.

21 j

Qf

You were on call.

Do you recall receiving a call

22 i from dispatch to go out to a wreck or a car that had slid off
23
24 >
25

of 1-80?
A

I did.

I received a call approximately six o'clock,

ten minutes to six, somewhere in that particular area.

I was
10

1
2

told there had heen a report of a slide off vehicle on 1-80
;

(inaudible) respond,

3

Q

And did you respond to that scene?

4

A

I did.

5

Q

Do you recall approximately how long it took you to

6 • get to that scene?
7 ,

A

That distance, it- would be 20 minutes maybe.

8 '

Q

Would it be fair to say then you arrived sometime

9 ; 6:10 to 6:20?
10

A

Yeah, that's about right, yes.

11

Q

What did you first observe when you came upon tSat

12

scene?

13

:

A

*

When I first come upon the scene, I could see where -

14

I was traveling eastbound and I could see where a vehicle had

15

actually skidded off the side of the road and traveled into the

16 '• median and made it about three quarters of the way across the
17

median and then became stuck in the mud.

18

Q

Will you describe the vehicle?

19

A

Just a minute here.

20

It's a 1990 Buick four-door,

license plate 890 Yankee Sierra Alpha, YSA Utah plate.

21

Q

Approximately what mile marker is this on 1-80?

22

A

This was at mile marker 18.

23

Q

Is that 18 miles from Wendover?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And you were eastbound?

It would be 18 miles from the state line.

A

I was.

The subject actually left the road going

eastbound but when I come around and actually made contact with
the vehicle and the subject I was then facing westbound.
Q

What indications did you receive from your observance

at the scene that the vehicle had originally been going
eastbound?
A

I could actually see skid marks where the vehicle had

slid off the road.
Q

Were those skid marks continuous then to where the

vehicle was?
'j

A

It was,

Q

The vehicle obviously has left the road and passed

through some dirt of that type of thing.

/

Was that a

continuation from those ski marks?
A

Yes.

From the ski marks into where the vehicle

actually was stuck was continuous tracks.
Q

You made your observations of the vehicle and the

skid marks.

What other observations did you make concerning

the scene?
A

When.I first arove (sic) at the scene, I could tell

that the vehicle was, in fact, stuck and there was some tracks
around it.

As I approached the vehicle itself, I was very

careful to observe if anybody had left.

When I first arrived I

couldn't see if there was anybody in the vehicle and so I
didn't know if somebody had already been stuck and left or

1

whatever and so I looked around purposely for any tracks

2

leaving the vehicle and there were none.

3
4

Q

ground there?

5 j
6

Were you able to ascertain the condition of the

A

It was mud.

It was soft.

It was easy to leave any

prints there. Anybody walking away would leave imprints.

7

Q

Did you notice any imprints leaving the vehicle in

8 i any direction?
9 j •'

A

There were imprints.

You could tell where the driver

10

had got out, walked to the front, to the back of the vehicle

11

looking at it.

12

the vehicle and then he got back out of the vehicle, walked

13

around to the passenger side and got into the passenger side.

He was stuck.

It appeared that he got back in J

14 i

Q

How stuck was the vehicle?

15

A

That mud is so slick out there. Once you get stuck

16

in it you have virtually no chance to get out of there without

17 , a wrecker.
18
19
20
21 •

Q

So this vehicle couldn't have moved at that point

then?
A
• ;,.,§;••

No.
You said that from up top - and I assume that that

22

would be the roadway - you couldn't ascertain whether anybody

23

was in the vehicle;

is that correct?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Did you then find anyone in the vehicle when you

approached the vehicle.
A

Yes. As I approached the vehicle I could see that

there was a male asleep in the passenger seat behind
(inaudible).
Q

Did you make contact with that male?

A

I did.

Q

Can you identify him?

A

Yes, I can.
THE COURT:

Do you acknowledge identity?

MR. BROADHEAD:
Q

Yes, Your Honor.

(BY MR. SEARLE)

Did you make physical contact then •

with the defendant?
A

I did.

It took me a while to get him woke up.

Q

Let me step back.

When you then - you looked in, you

observed that there was one occupant in the car, what did you any observations at that point?
A

He was the only person in the vehicle and that he was

asleep or passed out.
Q

So he was asleep at that point?

What steps did you

take then to make contact with him?
h
subject.

I opened the door, started trying to awaken the
It took quite a while for me to awake him.

finally wake up.
aggressive.

He come out of the car.

He did

He was very

I thought I was going to have to (inaudible) with

the subject until he finally cleared his mind enough to
14

(inaudible).
Q

So once his mind cleared up he recognized you and

calmed down?
A

As soon as it finally clicked that I was a law

enforcement officer and not somebody else (inaudible).
Q

Did you make any physical observations or sensory

observations concerning the defendant at that time?
A

Yes.

his person.

I could smell the odor of alcohol emitting from

Also, he did have red eyes, they were watering but

this also could have been because he just woke up and so this
was something that I watched throughout the period to seejif it?
was imitation of alcohol or just being the fact that he was
asleep.
Q

You could smell alcohol?

A

I could smell alcohol.

Q

The red eyes could have come from being asleep -

A

Correct.

Q

- at six in the morning.

When you're trying to

insure that a person that it's not just sleeping, that is that
someone is under the influence of alcohol, what steps do you
taketo

try to determine whether they're under the influence of

alcohol?
A

Well, it's a number of steps that we take and the

first one is (inaudible) you start looking for any evidence
saying that the subject has consumed some type of an alcoholic

beverage.

In this case, there was none in the vehicle and none

in the immediate area.

He wouldn't have been able to drink and

with the tracks being the way they were, say, throw a bottle
away.
Q

Did you look in the vehicle?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you search under the seats of the vehicle?

A

Yes.

Q

Was there any, and I believe the legal term is open

container, so was there a container which would have held an
alcoholic beverage, beer can, whatever, in that vehicle? -

•*

A

No.

Q

Did you see any in the immediate vicinity?

A

No.

Q

Did you look in the immediate vicinity?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Why did you look in the immediate vicinity?

A

From my experience in working out in that particular

area, it's not uncommon for people that have wrecked if they
have been drinking to try to hide the evidence from us as law
enforcement officers and they'11 shove alcohol cans in the
bushes, anyplace they possibly can.

They'll throw them

underneath their car or just anything they can possibly do to
hide the evidence from the law enforcement officers.
Q

Was there any bushes or anything around this vehicle?
• 16

1

A

No.

2

Q

Is that commonly termed the salt flats?

3 :

A

Yes, the salt flats.

Q

After making contact with the defendant and him

4

;

5

clearing himself and realizing that you're a law enforcement

6 ! officer, did you question him as to whether he'd been drinking?
!

7 l

A

Yes, I did.

I asked him if he had been drinking.

He

8 : told me he had, in fact, been drinking.
9

Q

Did he tell you what he had been drinking?

10 !

A

At first, let me look at the notes. On the scene he

11

l

said that I had been drinking Southern Comfort and then quickly;

12 • qualified that with my sister was driving, I wasn't.
13

Q

And what is Southern Comfort, do you know?

14 \

A

Southern Comfort is a whiskey, bourbon.

15

;

16 |
17

It's a

distilled liquor.
Q

After an individual indicates to you that they've

been drinking and you can smell some odor of alcohol do you

18 i conduct any tests to check for their physical abilities as to
19
20 !

drive a vehicle?
A

Yes, I do.

I do standard field sobriety testing and

21 < what this is is a method of testing, (inaudible) tasks to see
22 i if they're in fact capable of safely operating a motor vehicle.
23

Q

Have you been trained in these field sobriety tests?

24

A

Yes, I have.

25

Q

I'm sorry.

I'm an instructor.
I have this habit of jumping in. I
17

apologize to the Court (inaudible).

Are these the field

sobriety tests that you talked about that you teach?
A

Yes. '

Q

And you've been conducting these over the 24 years

that you've been a law enforcement officer?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

How many tests did you conduct with Mr. Henline at

that point?
A

I attempted to do the entire battery of three tests,

but because of his condition, he would not do the one leg stand
for me. He just could not do it.

The first of the three that I

we give in this battery is what we call the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test.

Nystagmus is a involuntary jerking of the eye

which a subject cannot control and this is enhanced greatly by
the introduction of some drugs or some drug categories.
Q

Now, Trooper, is this thing with the eyes, is this a

test then where if you have not consumed alcohol, is this a
test where you move the pen or something, some object in front
of their eyes?
A

Correct.

Q

And they follow that without moving their head; is

that correct?
A

Correct.

Q

And an individual who hasn't consumed alcohol can

follow that with their eyes looking as far as they can look
- •

13

without bouncing;
A
point.

is that correct?

Let me qualify that.

That's correct to a certain

One thing that the Court needs to know is there is one

percent of the population in the United States that have a
natural eye - or nystagmus but these people would know it
immediately and it's an immediate onset.

In other words, it's

not going to go out 20 degrees before it onsets.
Q

So one percent of the population has that?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Number 2 is if I move a stimulus quick enough in

front of anybody's eyes or somebody that's untrained
(inaudible), you'll actually get a movement of the eye that
appears to be a nystagmus.

One of the qualifications of this

is that nystagmus has to remain at maximum deviation at prior
to 45 degrees onset for a minimum of four seconds. This
illuminates the chances of anything being induced.
Q

Trooper, what is the maximum deviation?

A

Maximum deviation is when the stimuli has been moved

out to where the corner of the eye is looking as far as it can.
In other words, you can't see any white in the corner of the
eye out of this eye when he's looking at the stimulus.
Q

So the person would then be looking out the corner of

the eye, they're unable to move the eye any more to the right
or the left?
19

1 :

A

Correct.

2 :

Q

And at that point, a person who hasn't consumed

3

alcohol or under the influence, 99 percent of the people won't

4 ! have the bouncing in the eye;
5 !

A

is that correct?

Correct.

€ j
Q
Did you conduct this test according to how you've
s
•
7
been trained and how you teach it?
8 ''
A
I did.
t

9 I.

Q

10 J

Do you receive what are called clues?
MR. BROADHEAD:

Your Honor, may I interrupt real

11 i quickly?
12 I

.
THE COURT:

Yes.

!

13

!

-• J

•

MR. BROADHEAD:

.

•

•

•

.

I guess I'm questioning how relevant

i
14 J this is. We've already pretty much stipulated the fact that my
15 : client failed the field sobriety test. For the sake of time,
16 ! do we need to keep going over them all?
17 |

MR. SEARLE:

If we stipulate up to the (inaudible) of

18 j it then the only issue why we were bringing it up, Your Honor,
19

!

is that this came approximately 6:30 in the morning where the

20 i breath alcohol wasn't take until some time later. That's the
i

21 ! only reason.
22 |

If Mr. Broadhead stipulates to it—

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Broadhead stipulates.

23

You've had a stipulation and you may consider it as

24

established so the State has established by the agreement of

25

the parties that Mr. Henline failed the field sobriety tests.
20

1

Q

(BY MR. SEARLE)

When an individual fails the field

2 j sobriety test that you conduct, the different tests that you
3 ! do, what steps do you then take?
4 I

A

At that time we'll place him under arrest for driving

5 ' while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.
6 !

Q

Do you then begin an investigation as to drinking,

7 i what they drink, when they last drink, those type of things?
8 =

A

Yes, we do. We do a vehicle impound and at this

9 J particular point we have to take possession of the subject
10 ! vehicle for its safety and we do a .complete inventory of the
11 | vehicle. Also, we always check the area to make sure that

.1

12 | there's no evidence in that area and then after we do that, we
13

call for the wrecker and we take the subject, in where he is

14 : offered a breath or a (inaudible) sample. In this case it was a
15 ! (inaudible) sample.
16 j

Q

Did you question the defendant as to when he had been

17 | drinking?
18 ;

A

Yes, I did.

19 i

Q

And did you receive response to that?

I

20 I '
A
Yes. After the breath test was over or after he gave
!
21 some kind of a sample, in this case it was a breath test, we
i

22 I read him Miranda and I asked a battery of questions that the
23 ' State puts on the DUI form which we ask him.
24 !

Q

25 :

A

• "'-

And is one of those, have you been drinking?
Yes.
21
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1

Q

And did you receive a response to that question?

2 I

A

Yes.

3

Q

What response did you receive, Trooper?

4

A

He stated that he had been drinking.

5;

Q

Do you write down their answers as they give it to

A

I do.

8'

Q

And what answer did you write down?

9,

A

He says, "At the casino, yes."

6 ! you?
7j
j

I asked him what he

i

10 ! had been drinking and he said, "beer and shots of Southern

i i ; Comfort."

I asked him how much and he said, "Three to four

v

*

12 \ double shots."
13 j

Q

Did he say where he'd been drinking?

14 I

A

Yeah, it was at the casinos, either the Rainbow or

i

15 i

the Garter.

16 ;

Q

He actually named both of them.

Did you question him as to when he had his last

1 7 :• drink?
18

A

I did.

You ask them when they had their first drink,

19 : which he indicated between 9:30 and 10:00 the previous night
20 ; and the last drink he said he had was at 4:30 in the morning.
21 I

Q[

When you talked to (inaudible) you told the jury that

22

sometimes people will drink while there sitting there or hide

23

things.

24

concerning whether the individual has consumed any alcohol

25

after a crashed vehicle?

Is there a question on your form that you ask

1

A

Yes, in fact the question is "Have you had any

2

alcoholic beverage or drugs since the crash?" And his answer

3

was, "No".

4

Q

5

Trooper, did you subsequently then have Mr. Henline

perform a test, a breath alcohol test?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And I believe it was stipulated too.

8

What results

did you receive off of that?

9

A

10

The results from his breath test was a .173 percent

at 8:43 in the morning.

11

Q

So .173. What is the legal limit in the State of

13 ;

A

.08.

14 ;

Q

.08. So this is double. However, this comes - you

12

Utah?

15

get to the scene between 6:10 and 6:20.

This comes at 8:43?

16 '

A

Correct.

17 |

Q

So it's about two hours and 20 minutes approximately

18
19

after you first arrived at the scene?
:

20 |

A

From when I first arrived at the scene.

Q

Through your training over 24 years and continued

21 | training and teaching, do you learn about what's called burn
22

;

off rates or burn off lows?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And what is a burn off rate?

25

A

A burn off rate is the metabolism rate for the body's
23

1

process of eliminating any type of a foreign substance from it.

2

In other words, it's trying to hit (inaudible) which is

3

everything being equal.

4

burn this off.

5

.00015 percent per hour.

6

Q

The body doesn't like it so it has to -

The burn off rate on the average person is

So if an individual had not drank for four hours,

7

taking just simple math, that would .06 burn off after four

8

hours?

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

So if I had a .06 in my system, four hours later if

11

I'm normal, and I may not be the normal person, but four Hours -

12

later I should be back to a .00?

13 ;

A

Correct.

14 :

Q

Just one other thing, Trooper, do you have video

15

camera capabilities in your car?

16

A

I do.

17

Q

And do you know how to operate those?

18

A

Yes, I do,

19

Q

And was it operating on this date and time?

20

A

The camera was working fine, my actual lapel mic

21

wasn't transmitting the way it should so on this particular

22

tape, outside of the vehicle talking to the subject, you won't

23

hear anything. When we're inside the vehicle you can hear him

24

talking.

25

Q

I have a mic inside the vehicle and on my lapel.
The video portion however, was it operating properly?
24

